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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATION, SETTLEMENT AND DISTRIBU-
TION-Fraudulent Transfers Recovered by Trustee Are for
Benefit of All Creditors.- Upon the rendition of a decree in fa-
vor of a trustee in a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance,
the property inures not only to the benefit of the unsecured
creditors existing at the time of the transfer and who, in the
absence of bankruptcy would have been authorized to attack
the conveyance, but to all of the creditors having provable
claims, including those whose claims accrued subsequent to
the transfers. Mullen v. Warner (C. C. A., 4th Cir.), 7 Am. B. R.
(N. S.) 93.
AUTOMOBILES.-Guest Not Objecting to Speed is Not
Entitled to Recover for Injuries.-Plaintiff sought damages for
injuries sustained while riding as a guest in the front seat of an
automobile owned and driven by the defendant who upset as
he attempted to make a turn. Defendant was driving at a fast
and unlawful speed and did not slow down for the corner. Plain-
tiff did not object to the manner"and speed at which the latter
operated the car, but rather, as he testified, was satisfied with
the way defendant was driving. The alleged liability of de-
fendant is based on his conduct in handling the car. Held, a guest
of an automobile owner sitting in the front- seat and making no
objection to the unlawful speed at which the car is driven is barred
from recovery by his own concurring negligence. Wagen Bauer v.
Schwinn. (Pa. 1926.) 131 Atl. 689. A guest must use ordinary
and reasonable care under the circumstances "or be open to a charge
of contributory negligence. Parranwre v. Denver Ry. Co; 5 Fed.
(2d) 912.; Atwood vs. Utah Co. 44 Utah 366, 140 P. 137; White
v. Portland Co. 84 (Ore.) 643, Pac. 1005. In some jurisdictions
a guest is required to look and listen with prudence. Noble v. Chi.
A. & St. P. Ry. 298 Fed. 381. Greater care should not be re-
quired. Mr. Justice Cardozo looks with great disfavor upon the
rule which requires a guest to exercise more than ordinary care.
Active vigilance, suggestions, and remonstrances are "unnatural
and completely unrelated to the realities of life" because men
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are inclined more or less to rely upon the driver of the car and
are reluctant to interfere with the hand at the wheel. See 35 Harz'.
Law. Rev. 121. Back seat driving and harassing advice to one in
operation of a car should be discouraged. Much advice and
many suggestions are not conducive to its good management. Bru-
baker v. Iowa Co. (Wisc.) 183 N. W. 690, 18 A. L. R. 303. But
if the occupant sees the driver-is driving at an excessive rate of speed,
or in violation of the law, reasonable care would require that the
passenger protest. Brubaker v. Iowa, (Supra). Sharp v. Spnoat.
111 Kan. 735, 208 P. 613, 26 A. L. R. 1421. If the guest fails to
protest, he acquiesces in the reckless driVing and is guilty of con-
tributing to his own injury, precluding recovery. Carter v. Phil-
linzger. 142 Md. 365, 120 A. 378. Where a guest who had been
riding in an automobile driven at a fast rate or speed, had the op-
portunity, but failed to get out of the car, he was not deemed to
have been guilty of contributory negligence. Munson v. Rupker.
(Ind.) 148 N. E. 169. See 1 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 61 for dis-
cussion of the duty of an operator of an automobile to his guest.
EASEMENTS.-Reference in Deed to Lot Number and
Bounding Street Does Not Give An Easement in All Ways
Shown on Plan as Matter of Law.-"G" owned a tract of twenty
acres, in Lynn, which he had surveyed and a plan made. This
plan as recorded, showed three streets running in an elliptical
curve, in an east-west direction, converging at both the east and
west extremities of the tract, and from the point where they
converged on the eastern extremity there was a road, to which
the ways connected, leading to the main highway. On the west
end of the tract there was no outlet to a highway, there being a
lake around which the streets curved and joined at a common
point. The plaintiffs bought their lots adjoining the northern-
most street on the eastern half. The street was named in their
deeds as one of the boundaries of their lots. This street was
laid out and constructed as far as their lots adjoined. In none
of plaintiffs' deeds was there any easement or right of way ex-
pressly granted to the purchasers, nor any stipulation that the
ways should be kept open. Shortly following the sale to plain-
.tiffs their grantor conveyed all that remained of the tract to the
Pride of Lynn Cemetery Corporation, "with all-right, title, and
interest therein subject to the rights of others." From the Lynn
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Cemetery Corporation, the defendant bought the land it now
owns, west of plaintiffs', with a right of way over the street
in question, and the street below it, to the highway. By a new
plan which accompanied the deed to defendants it appeared that
the conveyance included that section of the street in question
which by the old plat ran through their purchase. Plaintiffs'
lots are situated east of defendant's land, between his land and
the highway, so that access to the public road does not necessi-
tate their passing over that section of the so-called street in ques-
tiQn, included in the grant to defendant. When the latter built
a fence inclosing the section of the road running through his
tract, plaintiffs objected, contending that since their deeds re-
ferred, to this street by name as a boundary of their lots, they
acquired a right of way over the full length of the street as it
appeared in the old plan. The defendant answered that con-
sidering the deeds, the plan, and the attending circumstances
together there appeared no expression of a right of way in plain-
tiffs over any part of the former's grant. Held, plaintiffs under
the state of facts acquired no right of way over the section of the
so-called street running through defendant's tract, as delineated in
the plan, but not marked out, used, or constructed. Wellwood v.
Havrah Mishna Anshi Sphard Cemetery Corp. (Mass. 1926) 150
N. E. 203. In delivering the opinion of the court, Sanderson,
J. said, "A plan referred to in a deed becomes a part of the con-
tract .so far as may be necessary to aid in the identification of
the lots and to determine the rights intended to be conveyed.
The mere reference in a deed does not as a matter of law give
the grantee an easement in all the ways shown thereon; nor pre-
vent the grantor from making changes therein not inconsistent
with the rights of the grantee. In the absence of an express
grant, where land is conveyed by reference to a plan, having
numerous lots bounding on different ways, a grant by implica-
tion of an onerous servitude upon other land of the grantor, not
necessary for the enjoyment of the land conveyed, is not to be
presumed unless such is clearly the intention of the parties. 'A.
reference to a plan in a deed, although accompanied by its use
for description or bounds, does not result in the conveyance of
rights not necessary for the enjoyment of the premises, in the
absence of an intent appearing to that effect.' Prentiss v. Gloucester,
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236 Mass. 36, 52; 127 N. E. 796, 799. In cases where it has been
held that the grant of a lot bounding on a way as shown on a
plan estopped the grantor and those claiming under him from
denying the existence of the way for its entire length in either
direction, it will usually appear that the way referred to was in
use or actually staked out on the land. In the case at bar the
way delineated on the plan leading west from plaintiffs' lands
had not been marked out or used as such, and it leads directly
to no public way. The plaintiffs have not proved a grant by
implication." In accord with the principal case, favoring the
rule that a reference to a plat laying out a tract of land does
not necessarily give every purchaser an easement over every
street laid out in the plan may be cited: State v. Hamilton, (Tenn.)
70 S. W. 619; Underwood v. Stuyvesant (N. Y.) 10 Am. D. 215;
Easements, 19 C. J. Sec. 130, P. 931 (Citing also, Jones, Ease-
ments Sec. 247). The authorities are not entirely harmonious as
to whether one receiving a conveyance of land described with re-
ference to a plat acquires a right of way over, or rather, corres-
ponding to, every street which, though non-existent, appears on
the plat. Some cases are to the effect that, while the grantee is
not restricted to such supposed streets as are actually adjacent
to his land, he acquires rights only in such as are reasonably
necessary for convenient accesses to and exits from the land con-
veyed, and that the grantor is not, as again.st him, estopped to
deny the existence of streets appearing on the plat which he
would not ordinarily have occasion to use for such purpose.
Tiffany, Real Property. (2nd) -Sec. 366, p. 1322. Many courts, con-
trary to the principal case, state the rule to be that where reference
is made to a map or plan, every purchaser takes all privileges, ad-
vantages, and easements, represented on the plat. Indianapolis v.
Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200, 51 Am. Rep. 749; Hall v. Breyfagle, 162
Ind. 494, 70 N. E. 883; Fisher v. Beard, 32 Ia. 346; Dubuque v. Ma-
loney, 9 Ia. 450, 74 Am. D. 358; Adair v. Spellman (Ga.) 79 S. E.
589; Highland Co. v. Avondale Co. (Ala.) 56 S. 716; Danielson v.
Sykes (Cal.) 109 Pac. 87, 28 L. N. S. 1024; Schneider v. Jacob,
(Ky.) 5 S. W. 350; Collins v. Land Co. (N. C.) 39 S. E. 21; Thax-
ter v. Turner (R. I.) 24 AUt. 829; Edwards v. Moundsville Co. (Va.)
48 S. E. 754; Bartlet v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460-cited in footnote, Ease-
ments, 19 C. J. Sec. 130; Tiffany, Real Prop. (2nd) Vol. II Sec. 366
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p. 1319. A great many of the above cases apply, or rather mis-
apply, the principle that by marking out streets and parks there
is a dedication, by which the grantee derives his easement, when
the plat is recorded. As between the grantor and grantee, how-
ever, in the event there is no acceptance of the dedication these
decisions must look to other reasons upon which to base their
rule. The grantee must have a right independent of the right
of the public, and such a right is found upheld in a number of
courts which apply the doctrine of estoppel by representation, i. e;
an easement is vested in the grantee who has been induced to buy
blieving in the existence of streets and public places as delineated
on the plat. See Tiffany, supra P. 1320 et seq. W. L. T.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.-Liability of husband for injury
to wife.-Defendant's wife, while riding with her husband, was
injured when he fell asleep and ran into a tree. She sued him
for personal injuries. Held, the wife could maintain an action in
tort against her husband for personal injuries resulting from his
negligence. Bushnell v. Bushnell, (Conn. 1925) 131 At. 43. The
court came to their decision by following the precedent established
in Brown v. Brown, 86 Conn. 42, 89A. 898, 52 L. R. A. N. S. 185,
Ann. Cas. 1915D, 70. Irt the Brown case the wife was allowed re-
covery for a wilful assault and battery and false imprisonment. In
that case the court found the right of the wife to sue, not in any
express statutory provision, but in a statute preserving the legal iden-
tity of the spouse. The principle case, by carrying the reasoning a
step further, permits recovery for a negligent injury.
At common law, owing to the identity of spouses, and as a matter
of policy, husband and wife were not liable for torts committed, by
one against the other. Thompson v. Thompson, (U. S.) 218 U. S.
611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. ed. 1180, 30 L. R. A. N. S. 1153, 21 Ann.
Cas. 921. Nor could the wife recover against a third person who
aided her husband. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27.
Nor could a divorced wife recover for torts committed against her
during coverture. Bandfleld v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N. W.
287, 72 Am. S. R. 387, 6 L. R. A. N. S. 191. The rights of a wife
have been altered considerably by statutory law and the courts are
not in harmony in interpreting the construction of such statutes.
It is generally held that a statute conferring upon a wife the right
to sue must expressly provide a right of action against a husband.
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Thompson v. Thompson, supra; Peters v. Peters, 156 Calif. 32, 103
Pac. 219, 23 L. R. A. N. S. 699; Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107
N. W. 1047, Am. S. R. 3, 6 L. R. A. N. S. 191; Keister v. Keister,
123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315, 1 A. L. R. 439. Other courts do not
require that the statute expressly give the right. Gilman v. Gilman
78 N. H. 4, 95 A. 657, L. R. A. 1916B 907, ;It has also been held
that where a statute does not expressly confer the right of action
against her husband but the purpose of the statute is to preserve
the identity of the wife during coverture it confers on her the right.
Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okl. 124, 140 Pac. 1022, 52 L. R. A. N. S.
189. Brown v. Brown, supra, and the principal case of Bushnell v.
Bushznell. Where the wife is given the rights of a feme sole by
statute, she has the' right to maintain an action against her husband.
Fitzpatrick v. Owens 124 Ark. 167, 187 S. W. 460, L. R. A. 1917B
774, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 772. In the Thompson case, sura, the court,
construing a statute of the District of Columbia providing-that mar-
ried women may sue for torts committed against them as fully and
freely as though unmarried, denied the wife recovery for assault and
battery committed upon her by her husband. Under the Georgia
statute a wife cannot maintain an action against her husband for
operating an automobile. Heyman v. Heyman 92 S. E. 25. Under
the- Missouri "Married Women's Act" neither spouse can sue the
other for negligence. Shewalter v. Wood 183 S. W. 1127 - cited in
Schouler, Domestic Relations 6th ed. Vol. I p. 673.
Contrary to the. principal case is the stand taken by the Minne-
sota courts. Woltman, v. Woltman 153 Minn. 217, 189 N. W. 1022;
Strom v. Strom, supra. The reason given is that the purpose of
such a statute-practically identical to that in Connecticut-is to
place the husband and wife upon an equality as to the right to bring
actions in tort, conferring upon her the same right as her husband
and no more. Since the husband is-unable to sue his wife for per-
sonal tort, they maintain that the statute gives her no such right
against him. See Woltman v. Woltman, supra, discussing Drake v.
Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624, 9 A. L. R. 1064. By com-
parison, the view taken by the Minnesota courts creates an impres-
sion of sounder construction. Courts are reluctant to permit
the- tranquility of the home to be destroyed. Moreover, judi-
cial legislation is a vicious thing which ought to be discouraged.
See MicH. LA.w. REv. (April 1926) p. 618, 619, for discussion of
the merits of the Connecticut rule. W. L. T.
